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Return to the Ethics Rules as a Standard for
Attorney Disqualification: Attempting Consistency




The motion to disqualify an attorney for a conflict of interest
has a lengthy, although sporadic history in the courts. Tradition-
ally, the motion was used to enforce the Canons of Ethics.' Be-
cause it was used infrequently, the motion, and the way in
which the courts applied the ethics rules to reach decisions,
received little attention from commentators.2 Recently, however,
there has been a surge in the filing of motions to disqualify. This
surge has increased support for the critical position that the
motion has been changed from a method of protecting client
confidences, to a method of gaining a tactical advantage for the
moving party.
Since the Canons of Ethics was adopted, the ethics rules have
intended to prevent one party from gaining a tactical advantage
by hiring an attorney who formerly represented the opposing
party. As the motion commonly operates now, however, the dis-
qualification itself grants a greater tactical advantage to the
party making the motion.3 Additionally, the motion to disqualify
often serves to increase the conflicts of interest present in the
litigation by setting the client's interests against those of the
* B.I.S. Weber University, J.D. University of Utah. The author is an associ-
ate with the firm of Thorpe, North & Western in Sandy, Utah.
1. Steven Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move
in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 227 (1987). See also CAN-
ON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Canon 6 (1908).
2. Goldberg, cited at note 1, at 227.
3. See Zachary Tobin, Towards a More Balanced Balancing: A Chronological
Approach to Attorney Disqualification, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 219, 219-20 (1985) ("Iron-
ically, despite the courts' desire to achieve a fairer trial by disqualifying the firm,
disqualification may actually precipitate greater injustice.").
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attorney.4
In the past, courts have relied heavily on the ethics rules to
determine when an attorney should be disqualified.' In virtually
all disqualification cases, the courts have first decided whether
the attorney has violated one or more of the ethics rules." If so,
the decision has generally been for disqualification. The courts
have also relied on the ethics rule of imputed (or vicarious) dis-
qualification.7 Not only was an attorney presumed to have re-
ceived confidential information, but the attorney's disqualifica-
tion was imputed to the entire firm.
Recent changes in the legal profession, however, have made
the rule of imputed disqualification less of a justifiable safe-
guard and more of a hinderance to fair play in the litigation
arena.' For this reason, courts have departed from their reli-
4. See James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification,
1982 AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 421, 432 (1982). The motion to disqualify instantly cre-
ates a conflict of interest between the attorney that is the subject of the motion and
his or her client. Id. The attorney may be tempted to litigate the matter to clear his
or her name; to settle so that the opposing side will withdraw the motion; or with-
draw, even if the motion is groundless, to avoid bad publicity. Id. Each of these
options puts the attorney in a potential conflict with the best interests of the client.
Id.
5. See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While declar-
ing that the code of professional responsibility was not binding on the courts, the
court in USFL stated, "[t]he Code nevertheless will continue to provide guidance for
the courts in determining whether a case would be tainted by the participation of
an attorney or firm." USFL, 605 F. Supp. at 1463 n.31 (quoting Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 n.26 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S.
1106 (1981)).
6. See Lindgren, cited at note 4, at 425 ("Indeed, most courts begin their
analyses of disqualification by examining the Code, or cases that themselves are
based on the Code. Courts deciding disqualification motions often see their job as
applying or interpreting the Code.').
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1974) ("If a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a
Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or
his firm may accept or continue such employment."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 1.10(a) (1983) ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.").
8. See Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985). In Koller, the court stated:
The tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings,
deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass
the opponent has become so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as
to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. We are aware of no
comparable phenomenon in criminal cases. The apparent interest of many civil
litigants in delaying adjudication and their use of disqualification motions to
help accomplish that end militate in favor of immediate review of orders
granting such motions. To insulate from prompt review an erroneous order
granting a motion to disqualify counsel would only raise the stakes in this
dangerous game.
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ance on the disciplinary rules as the standard for disqualifica-
tion. Instead, many courts have adopted the view that imputed
disqualification may be overcome by the use of attorney screen-
ing.9
Screening procedures and mechanisms are often referred to as
"Chinese walls," as a fictional wall is constructed between the
attorney allegedly having the confidential information and the
attorney or attorneys who are handling the related case. If used
properly, the process of screening attorneys with confidential
information should be able to achieve the goal of preserving
client confidences while avoiding the abuse of the disqualifica-
tion motion as a tactical device.
. This article begins by discussing the rationale behind the
doctrine of imputed disqualification. It then considers the vari-
ous approaches that the ethics rules have taken with respect to
imputed disqualification. Next, the article traces the evolution of
the doctrine of imputed disqualification that has developed from
courts' decreased reliance on the ethics rules as the standard
upon which disqualifications are based. This article also ad-
dresses the approaches of the federal circuit courts to the screen-
ing controversy. Finally, the varying approaches are used as a
basis to propose standards for applying the ethics rules in deter-
mining whether to grant a motion for disqualification. If applied
properly, the use of screening devices and procedures should
protect the confidences of former clients without overly restrict-
ing attorney mobility and the subsequent client's right to coun-
sel of choice.
IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION
The Purpose of Disqualification
The prohibition against the representation of clients with
conflicting interests reflects three major ideals. First, the attor-
ney owes a duty of loyalty to his client and to the client's confi-
dences. Second, the attorney must represent the client in a zeal-
ous manner. Third, the attorney must not attempt to represent a
client when the attorney's judgment may be clouded by other
concerns.10
Koller, 737 F.2d at 1051 (citations omitted). See also Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d
1098, 1099-1100 (10th Cir. 1985); Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d
290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979); Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp.
724, 719 (E.D. Va. 1990).
9. See notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
10. See T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265,
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Successive representation fosters an inherent conflict among
these ideals." When an attorney has knowledge of confidential
information about his client's adversary, it is difficult to provide
a zealous representation to the present client without revealing
the former client's confidences. The attorney is placed in the
difficult situation of determining exactly what information may
be used and what must be kept confidential. Additionally, the
possibility that the former client's confidences will be accidental-
ly revealed and harm the former client is always present. 2 To
avoid these problems, the ethics rules and the courts have taken
a prophylactic approach, which generally prohibits the subse-
quent representation."
Applying Imputed Disqualification
The practical application of the prohibition involves two steps.
The first is the "primary" disqualification - that of the attorney.
Once a court determines that the two representations are "sub-
stantially related,""' the court will presume that the client's
confidences were revealed to the attorney during the earlier
representation. 5  The presumption that confidences were
shared with the attorney is generally held to be irrebuttable.'6
This is because in many cases, although an attorney may not
have received any confidential information from the former cli-
ent, to determine whether confidences were actually shared
would require an inquiry into the very information that the
266-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
11. See Frances Hamermesh, In Defense of a Double Standard in the Rules of
Ethics: A Critical Reevaluation of the Chinese Wall and Vicarious Disqualification, 20
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 245, 247 (1986).
12. T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 269.
13. See Note, Developments In The Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Pro-
fession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1471 n.8 (1981) ('[Tihe 'substantial relationship'
test . . . is a standard for determining when representation is to be proscribed for
prophylactic reasons.") (citations omitted).
14. See T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268 (noting that, "where any substan-
tial relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation
and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited").
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435,
440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983); Analytica v. NDP Research, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). But see Freeman v.
Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Cheng v. GAF Corp.,
631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). For a
discussion of those cases where the presumption was held to be irrebuttable see
notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
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former client is seeking to protect.1" In recognition of this prob-
lem, the courts have typically held that the nature and extent of
the confidential information actually received by the attorney is
irrelevant and not subject to inquiry. 8 Instead, the attorney
must simply be disqualified from the case.
Several more recent decisions have adopted the view that the
presumption of shared confidences can be rebutted if the attor-
ney can show that he or she was not privy to any confidential
information." This view, however, is the minority and rarely
used. The situations that have permitted an attorney to rebut
the presumption have generally involved associates of large
firms who performed minor tasks such as researching specific
points of law.'
If a court finds that an attorney has acquired confidential
information, or finds that any presumption has not been rebut-
ted, the attorney must be disqualified. After the initial disquali-
fication, the court must also decide whether to apply the pre-
sumption of shared confidences to the firm of the disqualified
attorney. This "secondary" presumption is referred to as the
doctrine of imputed disqualification.2 The doctrine presumes
that the disqualified attorney shared the confidences of the prior
client with the entire firm. If this presumption is applied and ac-
cepted, the disqualified attorney's entire firm must also be dis-
qualified in order to prevent the firm from using confidential in-
formation obtained from the prior representation.22
The courts have taken two views on the doctrine of imputed
disqualification. The traditional approach has corresponded to
that of the doctrine of primary disqualification. If an attorney
was actually or presumptively exposed to confidential informa-
tion it was also presumed that the attorney had shared the
information with the firm." Like the doctrine of primary dis-
17. T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268.
18. This view is expressed in T. C. Theatre, "[tihe Court will assume that dur-
ing the course of the former representation confidences were disclosed to the attor-
ney bearing on the subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their
nature and extent." Id.
19. See notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 518 F.2d at 757; Freeman, 689 F.2d at
723 n.1l.
21. The doctrine of imputed disqualification is also known as the "vicarious
disqualification doctrine." See Warren Fields, Attorneys: Vicarious Disqualification
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 231, 231 n.1 (1987).
The term "imputed" is now common due to the use of the word in the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. Id.
22. See Fields, cited at note 21, at 235.
23. Id. at 236.
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qualification, this presumption was held to be irrebuttable.
Thus, if an attorney was disqualified, the attorney's firm was
automatically disqualified. This view has been adopted and is
currently applied by the ethics rules as well.'
The problem with this view is that it casts an unnecessarily
wide shadow. Not only is it possible that an attorney who did
not actually receive confidential information will be disqualified,
but that his or her entire firm may also be disqualified. To allow
irrebuttable presumptions to disqualify a party's counsel causes
significant hardship in exchange for arguably little additional
protection.
Because of the changes that have occurred in the legal profes-
sion, the developing trend is to make the presumption of shared
confidences rebuttable.' Thus, if the firm can show that the
disqualified attorney did not share any confidential information
with other members of the firm, only the individual attorney
will be disqualified. In order to show that confidences have not
been shared, the firm may rely on the use of the screening
mechanisms and procedures commonly referred to as "Chinese
walls."6
The use of Chinese walls raises two questions. First, does the
use of screening procedures strike the proper balance between
protecting client confidences and allowing opponents relative
freedom to counsel of choice? Secondly, if these procedures are
effective, should the ethics rules be altered so that a court-ap-
proved screening procedure does not remain a technical violation
of the rules? If used properly, Chinese walls may permit an
affirmative answer to both questions.
The Flood of Motions to Disqualify
Over the last twenty-five years, the legal profession has
changed dramatically. During this time, two significant factors
have increased the risk of conflicts of interest. First, the manner
in which law is practiced has changed substantially. Where most
24. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 33
(1931); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1969); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1983).
25. See Tobin, cited at note 3, at 221.
26. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discus-
sion of Schiessle see notes 111-14 and accompanying text. The term "Chinese wall"
refers to a non-physical barrier erected between one attorney and the other members
of the firm, so as to not "taint" the firm or the other attorneys in their representa-
tion of a client. See Developments in the Law, cited at note 14, at 1367 ("Chinese
walls therefore rely on 'structural, procedural, and educational methods for contain-
ing confidential information.' ").
Vol. 33:249
Consistency in Attorney Disqualification
attorneys formerly practiced in small firms, today, large firms
that employ hundreds of attorneys are commonplace."' Large
firms, and especially those with many remote offices, render an
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences between an at-
torney and every member of the firm unrealistic. It is unlikely
that a particular attorney has been privy to the confidences
shared between every client and attorney in the firm. The prob-
lem of imputed disqualification as a consistently applied rule
becomes more significant when one realizes that the trend to-
ward large firms has led to an increase in actual conflicts of
interest.s While the number of firms being "conflicted out" is
increasing, the courts should not continue to employ standards
that disqualify firms when no actual conflict exists.
The second factor increasing the risk of conflicts is the in-
creased mobility of attorneys. Similar to other professions, attor-
neys have become increasingly mobile in the last two decades. 9
While it used to be common for an attorney to stay with the firm
that hired him out of law school, it is now common for associates
and even partners to change firms due to firm restructuring and
other causes."o With a change of firms comes greater potential
for conflicts. The attorney changing firms must not only consider
that his current clients may have interests adverse to the new
firm, but must also consider all clients represented in the past.
When these two trends are combined, the problem grows expo-
nentially. Large firms with a great number of "lateral" hires and
attorneys who leave are placed in a very difficult position. For
example, if the transferring attorney is in a specialized field,
such as intellectual property or admiralty, the probability is
high that any firm he or she joins will have some conflict with
the clients of the former firm.31
27. Donald McMinn, ABA Formal Op. 88-356: New Justification for Increased
Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231,
1232 (1990) (noting that firms of more than 100 attorneys were considered re-
markably large in 1964; in contrast, in 1990 there were over 250 firms with more
than 100 attorneys, the largest being Baker & McKenzie with 1339 attorneys).
28. Geoffrey Hazard, Close Watch Must Be Kept For Conflicts, NA'L L.J., Sept.
26, 1988, at 13 (recommending that all firms develop a system for keeping track of
possible conflicts because "the risk of a disqualification has become ever-present").
29. See Goldberg, cited at note 1, at 228-30 (noting that lateral moves and
mergers have become so common that legal publications have regular columns re-
garding the "most noteworthy rearrangements").
30. See Lawyer Layoffs, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, July 10, 1994, at F3. Seven per-
cent of attorneys laid off in 1993 were partners having an average base salary of
$175,500. Id.
31. The problem is only exacerbated by the current downturn in the legal
economy. Large lay-offs at major firms result in an increased transfer of attorneys
between firms. This may cause many attorneys in a given practice area to be "con-
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While the number of disqualifications caused by the changes
in the practice of law is reason for concern, there is another
cause for the increase in motions for disqualification. In recent
years, attorneys have learned that they can use the disqualifica-
tion rules to their tactical advantage." By using the motion
strategically, an attorney can drive up an opponent's litigation
costs, delay a case from being resolved, embarrass the opposing
attorney or that attorney's client, and even force an opposing
party to settle.'
By the early 1980s, the courts and scholars began to recognize
that many motions to disqualify were being made for such tacti-
cal purposes rather than for the protection of client confidenc-
es.3' To discourage this practice, courts began to provide strict-
er standards for disqualification." The courts soon realized that
although there were circumstances that justified attorney dis-
qualification due to prior representation, the harm done to a cur-
rent client by disqualifying the entire firm would greatly out-
weigh the protection given to the confidences of the former cli-
ent.' Thus, courts borrowed the concept of screening devices
from the investment banking industry in order to protect the
former client's confidences while allowing the current client their
counsel of choice."
THE ETHIcs RULES AND THE ABA
While the ethics rules promulgated by the American Bar Asso-
ciation are not binding on the courts, the courts have tradition-
ally relied heavily on these rules to determine when a motion for
disqualification should be granted.' The courts' recent accep-
flicted out."
32. See Goldberg, cited at note 1, at 228.
33. See Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions And Intra-Firm Screening:
The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Coun-
sel, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 401 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Freeman v. Chicago Musical
Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Anthony D'Amato,
Disqualification of Counsel: The Westinghouse Litigation, 61 CHI. B. REC. 88 (1979);
Tobin cited at note 3, at 219; Christian F. Hummel, Note, Attorney Disqualification:
The Case for an Irrebuttable Presumption Rebutted, 44 ALB. L. REV. 645, 648 (1980).
35. The courts which led the move to stricter standards for disqualification are
the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits. For a discussion of these
cases see notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607
F.2d 186, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
37. See Linda Ann Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualifi-
cation Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REV. 863,
882-83 (1987).
38. See USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also
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tance of the use of screening to avoid imputed disqualification in
private law firms, however, marks a divergence from the ethics
rules. The acceptance of screening by courts and the changes in
the practice of law have led the American Bar Association to
recognize the necessity of updating the rules of ethics.'
The Canons of Professional Ethics
The principle behind the prohibition on subsequent represen-
tation of adverse interests dates back to the original Canons of
Professional Ethics. Canon 6 stated, in part, "Itihe obligation to
represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance
of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confi-
dence has been reposed."' Canon 6 provided the basis for the
presumption of shared confidences. Canon 6, however, failed to
mention other members of an attorney's firm. On its face, Canon
6 did not indicate that there was anything wrong with allowing
another member of a firm to take a case that one attorney could
not. Unfortunately, the failure of the canon to address the abili-
ty of another attorney within the firm to take such a case creat-
ed the potential for abuse.
In 1931, the American Bar Association issued its first opinion
on the doctrine of imputed disqualification.4 Formal Opinion
33 maintained that because relations within a firm are very
close, members should not handle cases that other members of
the firm could not under Canon 6.2 This restriction was to ap-
ply even if the attorney had not been affiliated with the firm at
the time of the previous representation.' The opinion succinct-
ly concluded that "all the members [of the firm] are barred from
accepting any employment, that any one member of the firm is
Winslow, cited at note 37, at 864 ("Historically, the bases for disqualification[s] . . .
have been violations of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics,
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and most recently, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.').
39. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 88-356 (1988), reprinted in, Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA)
901:116-127 (1991) [hereinafter Formal Op. 88-356].
40. T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268 (quoting THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1908)).
41. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 33]. See also Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the Disqualified
Lawyer: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 37,
39 (1987).





The Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code"). For the first
time, the ethics rules adopted the doctrine of imputed disqualifi-
cation.' The rule, however, was extremely narrow. Imputed
disqualification was limited to situations occurring "under DR 5-
105." Rule 5-105 required an attorney to decline employment
where "his independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the proffered
employment."47 Unlike Formal Opinion 33, however, the Code
did not explicitly prohibit firm members, in all instances, from
representing someone that a particular member of the firm could
not. The Code prohibition focused upon the effect of the repre-
sentation on the attorney's judgment - where one attorney was
disqualified from representing a client, another attorney within
the firm could represent that client provided it would not ad-
versely affect the representing attorney's judgment.
Recognizing the vagueness of the provision, the ABA attempt-
ed to clarify and broaden the scope of the rule. In 1974, Rule 5-
105 was amended to apply to situations such as subsequent
representation, but the amendment made the rule much too
broad." The new rule prohibited firm members from represent-
ing a client whenever another member would be prevented from
doing so under any of the disciplinary rules. 9
Soon after the amendment, the ABA realized the problems
such a broad prohibition created. In 1975, the ABA released
Formal Opinion 342'° in an apparent attempt to mitigate the
amendment's effects. Formal Opinion 342 adopted the view that
screening could serve as a defense to a motion for disqualifica-
44. Id.
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLrY DR 5-105(D) (1969) [herein-
after Rule 5-1051.
46. Rule 5-105, cited at note 45.
47. Id.
48. See Fields, cited at note 21, at 236.
49. The new rule provided that, "[ilf a lawyer is required to decline employ-
ment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue
such employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D)
(1974).
50. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975), reprinted in 62 A-B.. J. 517 (1976) [hereinafter Formal Op. 342].
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tion.61 The opinion, however, limited the defense to former gov-
ernment attorneys and required that the government consent to
the representation.
6 2
In promulgating Formal Opinion 342, the Ethics Committee
was aware that strict application of the disqualification rule
would prevent qualified lawyers from accepting positions in the
government.' As the opinion noted, strict application would
turn government employees into "typhoid Marys."" Few attor-
neys would accept a job with the government if such a position
would prevent them from obtaining future employment. Like-
wise, law firms would be unlikely to hire former government
attorneys if the firms would be barred from any case involving
the attorney's former agency.
Although the Code did not make specific reference to the use
of screening, the courts viewed Formal Opinion 342 as a de facto
amendment to the Code." It was not long before attorneys and
commentators in the private sector argued that allowing the
screening defense for former public attorneys, but not for private
attorneys, was both unreasonable and unfair. The courts agreed,
and permitted screening by private law firms."
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
At the same time that the courts permitted screening for at-
torneys in private practice, the ABA was debating whether to
allow screening under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 7 The original comment to Rule 1.10 implicitly allowed
screening as a defense in the private sector. The second para-
graph of comment 11 provided:
Relevant factors in determining the likelihood of actual access of infor-
mation relating to representation of a client include the professional
experience of the lawyer in question, the division of actual responsibility
for the matter involved, the organizational structure of the firm or other
association involved, the sensitivity of the information and its relevance
to the affairs of the affected clients, and the nature and probable effec-
51. Formal Op. 342, cited at note 50.
52. Id.
53. See Fields, cited at note 21, at 241.
54. Formal Op. 342, cited at note 50, at 518.
55. See Fields, cited at note 21, at 243.
56. Id. The first court to adopt this view appears to have been the Court of
Claims. In Kesselhaut v. United States, the court relied on Formal Op. 342 to decide
that screening the conflicted attorney was sufficient to prevent firm disqualification.
Kesselhaut v. United States 555 F.2d 791, 792-93 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
57. Compare Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) with MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.10 (1983).
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tiveness of screening measures.
Unlike the courts, however, the ABA decided against adopting
the screening defense. Instead the ABA used the comment to
explain why screening is permissible for former government at-
torneys but not for private attorneys."9 The primary rationale
given was that, although the government's confidences should be
protected, a strict application of the rule could prevent it from
obtaining competent counsel. Thus, the government's own need
for attorneys outweighed the risk of its confidences being re-
vealed. With this explanation, the ABA clarified its position that
the screening defense should remain limited to former govern-
ment attorneys.
Formal Opinion 88-356 - The Expansion of Screening
In 1988, the ABA finally extended the use of screening to pri-
vate attorneys, but on a limited scale.' In Formal Opinion 88-
356, the ABA recognized that the realities of today's legal prac-
tice require screening to avoid imputed disqualification. The
opinion acknowledged that the use of temporary attorneys was
growing rapidly."' The opinion also acknowledged that applying
the ABA's traditional view of imputed disqualification meant that
many firms would be prohibited from using temporary attor-
neys.' To resolve the problem, the ABA opinion permitted the
isolation of the temporary attorneys from the rest of the firm to
avoid conflicts.'
The acceptance of a screening defense for temporary attorneys
has been significant. Unlike the screening of former government
attorneys approved in Formal Opinion 342, the screening of tem-
porary attorneys avoids the public policy argument upon which
the government relied. Instead, the opinion is based on the reali-
ties of the legal profession. When viewed together, Formal Opin-
ions 342 and 88-356 provide a good foundation for the argument
that a screening defense should be allowed for full-time, nongov-
ernment attorneys, so long as the screen is effective.'
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10, cmt. 11 (original
draft).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10, cmt. 11 (1983).




64. McMinn, cited at note 27, at 1235.
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Formal Opinion 90-358
Two years after Formal Opinion 88-356, the ABA refused to
broaden screening to cover other private attorneys. In Formal
Opinion 90-358,' the ABA addressed* the disqualification of a
firm based on a preemployment interview. One tactic used by
some companies is to discuss their case with most of the major
law firms in an area before deciding on who will actually be re-
tained as counsel. As a result of the initial consultation, none of
these firms could then represent the company's opponent.'
Thus, law firms requested the ABA to issue an opinion on the
acceptability of screening the attorney that conducted the inter-
view so that the firm could accept the case.
Although the ABA recognized that screening had become the
trend, it held to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
refused to permit the screening defense unless the information
was of minor importance."7 This strict interpretation and adher-
ence to the Model Rules marks an extended split between the
courts and the ABA over the issue of attorney disqualification. By
resisting the transition toward screening instead of guiding it,
the ABA is losing the role it has had in setting standards for
attorney disqualification.
THE CHANGING APPROACH
Even before any ethics rules were formally adopted, attorneys
were expected to avoid certain types of conduct. For more than a
century, courts have held that an attorney should not switch
sides in a legal dispute. In Hatch v. Fogerty," the New York Su-
perior Court adopted a preventative approach to keep attorneys
from using information obtained from one side in the representa-
tion of the opponent in the same matter. The court stated:
It is fundamental in respect to the duty of an attorney towards his
client, that he should not use any information which he has derived from
his client, to the prejudice or injury of his client; and especially, that he
shall not act in opposition to his client's interests;... lest any tempta-
tion should exist to violate professional confidence, or to make any im-
proper use of information which an attorney has acquired confidentially,
as well as upon the principles of public policy, "he will not be permitted
65. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Formal Op. 90-358
(1990) [hereinafter Formal Op. 90-358].
66. Lindgren, cited at note 4, at 435.
67. Formal Op. 90-358, cited at note 65, at 6-7.
68. 40 How. Pr. 492 (N.Y. Super. 1871).
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to be concerned on one side of proceedings in which he was originally in
a different interest.
In Hatch, the court disqualified the attorney because the attorney
had obtained confidential information about the former client's
case.
70
Although attorneys were not permitted to switch sides on a
case if they had confidential information, the former client actu-
ally had the burden to show that the attorney had acquired such
information. In Watson v. Watson," the court again faced the
problem of an attorney switching sides. In quoting a popular
treatise the court noted:
When an attorney has been employed in a cause, and is afterward
discharged by his client, not on the ground of misconduct, the court will
not restrain him from acting for the opposing party, unless it clearly and
distinctly appears that he has obtained information in his former charac-
ter which would be prejudicial to the cause of his former client to commu-
nicate.
72
The court in Watson, however, found that the attorney had actu-
ally acquired confidential information and disqualified him."
The "Substantially Related" Test
Courts realized that the rule requiring the party moving for
disqualification to prove that the attorney had obtained confiden-
tial information was not realistic. As the District Court of the
Southern District of New York indicated, the effort to prove the
transfer of confidential information required the court to delve
into the very matters that the former client wished to keep confi-
dential.7 4 Because of these concerns, the courts decided that a
better approach was to assume that the client had revealed confi-
dences to the attorney. 75 This view was developed in T. C.
69. Hatch, 40 How. Pr. at 503 (citations omitted).
70. Id.
71. 11 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
72. Watson, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (quoting WEEKS ON ArroRNEYs AT LAW, § 271
at 455, § 279 at 466).
73. Watson, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
74. See T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
75. See T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268; see also Freeman v. Chicago Musi-
cal Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982); Novo Terapeutisk
Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (en
banc); Melamed v. ITI' Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1979);
Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978);
Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1974); Emle Industries, Inc. v.
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Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc."5
The decision in T. C. Theatre was based on Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics." The court noted that Canon 6
imposed upon attorneys a duty of confidentiality to their cli-
ents.7" Representing an adverse client in a subsequent matter
that was "substantially related" to the original representation
would cause the former client to fear that his (or her) confidences
were being betrayed." Because this amounted to a violation of
the ethics rules, it appeared that the attorney would be disquali-
fied.
Unlike the previous cases, however, the court in T. C. Theatre
refused to place the burden of proof upon the moving party. In-
stead, the court established a sweeping change now referred to as
the "substantially related" test.' The doctrine required only
that the former client show that the "matters embraced within
the pending suit ... are substantially related to the matters or
cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him,
the former client."8'
The court's opinion in T. C. Theatre further adopted a pre-
sumption of shared confidences. The court noted:
The Court will assume that during the course of the former representa-
tion confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject
matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their nature and
extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be
enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged communications
be maintained.'
Thus, the court applied an irrebuttable presumption that the
attorney had acquired confidential information from his former
client, and accordingly, had to be disqualified.
The "substantially related" test of T. C. Theatre, although
modified, has been widely adopted.' At present, the majority of
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973). Initially, most courts presume
shared confidences; the differences between jurisdictions is whether this presumption
is rebuttable. See notes 91-102 and accompanying text for cases holding that the
presumption is rebuttable.





81. T. C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268.
82. Id. at 268-69.
83. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722
(7th Cir. .1982); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607
F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Melamed v. rIV Continental Baking Co.,
592 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1979); Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir.
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courts follow modifications of the test much like the one adopted
by the Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp.8
In Gulf Oil, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit modi-
fied the "substantially related" test in order to make its applica-
tion more workable. The court formulated a three part inquiry to
determine whether a confidential relationship existed.' First,
the judge would reconstruct the scope of the prior legal represen-
tation." Then the judge would determine whether a reasonable
inference could be drawn to indicate that the confidential infor-
mation allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer repre-
senting a client in those matters.87 Finally, the judge would de-
termine if the information was relevant to the issues raised in
the litigation against the former client." If so, the court was to
presume that the attorney was privy to confidential informa-
tion. 9 As discussed previously, this kind of presumption has
traditionally been irrebuttable. Thus, if the two representations
were substantially related, the attorney would automatically be
disqualified.
In reaching its decision, the Gulf Oil court made it clear that
the attorney's disqualification was based upon a violation of Can-
ons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.' As pre-
viously indicated, however, the courts were not exclusively rely-
ing on the ethics rules to decide disqualification motions.
Primary Disqualification
The first blow to the irrebuttable presumption at the "primary"
stage came from the Second Circuit.9 ' In Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,9 the Second Circuit held
that if the attorney could show that there was no realistic chance
1977); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754
(2d Cir. 1974); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir.
1973); see also Tobin, cited at note 3, at 220-21 nn.11-12.
84. 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).





90. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 588 F.2d at 224, 228. Canon 4 provides, "[a]
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1969). Canon 9 provides, "[a] Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969).
91. Goldberg, cited at note 1, at 243-47.
92. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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that client confidences were obtained, the presumption would be
rebutted.s In practical application, however, the standard varies
little from the substantial relationship test of T. C. Theatre.4
As with the substantially related test, "the Court must ask
whether it can reasonably be said that in the course of the for-
mer representation the attorney might have acquired information
related to the subject of the subsequent representation."5 Logi-
cally, if there is no realistic chance that the attorney obtained
client confidences, the court could not reasonably find that the
attorney might have acquired information related to the repre-
sentation. The decision in Silver was essentially a finding that
the attorney involved did not fall within the confines of the sub-
stantially related test. However, by holding that the attorney's
limited involvement rebutted the presumption of shared confi-
dences, the court opened the way for the view that the presump-
tion of shared confidences is truly rebuttable.
The next major break from the application of an irrebuttable
presumption in primary disqualification cases occurred five years
after Silver Chrysler Plymouth." In 1980, in Cheng v. GAF
Corp.," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that
the standard of proof to rebut the presumption of shared confi-
dences should not be "unattainably high.98 Even if an attorney
could have obtained confidential information from the client, he
or she could rebut the presumption by a reasonable showing that
such confidences had not, in fact, been obtained. Therefore, the
motion to disqualify need not be automatically granted.
A further blow to the irrebuttable presumption came in Free-
man v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co." In Freeman, the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized that disqualification could create numer-
ous hardships for the client, embarrassment for the attorney, and
a potential for abuse by those seeking a tactical advantage."®
Because of these concerns, the court refused to apply an irrebut-
table presumption."0 ' Instead, the court remanded the case for a
hearing on whether the presumption that the attorney had ac-
93. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 757.
94. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of T. C. Theatre.
95. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 757.
96. See Fields, cited at note 21, at 234 (citing cases holding the primary pre-
sumption to be rebuttable, but noting that several were based on misapplied prece-
dent).
97. 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
98. Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1056-57.
99. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
100. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 719-20.
101. Id. at 722 (citing Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186,
197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc)).
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quired confidential information had been successfully rebut-
ted.
10 2
Despite Silver Chrysler, Cheng and Freeman, the general rule
still seems to be that the presumption of shared confidences at
the primary level is irrebuttable1 " Although an irrebuttable
presumption seems too restrictive, a sufficiently high standard
should be applied to an attorney attempting to represent the
opponent of a former client in a "substantially related" matter.
An attorney who is dishonest could put former clients at a great
disadvantage by using their confidences against them.
Imputed Disqualification
The secondary presumption, that a firm should be disqualified
whenever an attorney within the firm is disqualified, has also
been moved out of the irrebuttable category. Logically, if an at-
torney can rebut the presumption that he or she obtained confi-
dential information from a client, the firm should be able to show
that its members did not receive confidential information from an
"infected" attorney.
Though secondary disqualification emerged from an ethics
opinion" rather than the ethics rules themselves, the courts
have applied it with equal vigor. Until recently, most courts had
held that this secondary disqualification was irrebuttable. °5
The first refusal to apply an irrebuttable presumption to the
situation of an attorney sharing client confidences with the firm
arose in the Seventh Circuit."° In Novo Terapeutisk Labora-
torium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories," the court assert-
ed that a disqualification based on an irrebuttable presumption
created a great amount of unnecessary hardship for clients and
attorneys." s In order to balance the interests of the present and
former clients, the court recognized that a more flexible approach
was necessary to reach a "just and sensible ruling on ethics mat-
ters." "°c While recognizing that the presumption of shared confi-
102. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723.
103. See Winslow, cited at 37, at 870.
104. Formal Op. 33, cited at note 41.
105. See Marc Steinberg & Timothy Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The
Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (1987).
106. Peterson, cited at note 33, at 402.
107. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
108. Baxter Travenol, 607 F.2d at 196-97.
109. Id. at 197. The facts in the case are unusual. The attorney moving for
disqualification had been a member of the opposing firm and began discussing the.
potential suit with the defendants shortly before he left. Id at 194-95. A year and a
half later, due to a transfer from another district court, his former firm was re-
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dences should "generally" be irrebuttable at the level of the at-
torney, the court took a much more lenient view toward rebutting
the presumption at the level of the firm. 0 Because the pre-
sumption had been "clearly and effectively rebutted" in Baxter
Travenol, the court allowed the firm to continue the representa-
tion."'
Several years later, in Schiessle v. Stephens,"' the Seventh
Circuit again led the way by allowing the use of screening proce-
dures and devices to rebut the secondary presumption of shared
confidences where an attorney moved from one private firm to
another.1  The Schiessle court held that the presumption of
shared confidences is rebuttable:
(Bly demonstrating that "specific institutional mechanisms" (e.g., "Chi-
nese Walls") had been implemented to effectively insulate against any
flow of confidential information from the "infected" attorney to any other
member of his present firm. Such a determination can be based on objec-
tive and verifiable evidence presented to the trial court and must be
made on a case-by-case basis."'
The court, however, disqualified the firm because it had failed to
show that any such mechanisms had been in place when the
attorney joined the firm."'
Since Schiessle, the majority of courts have moved away from
an irrebuttable presumption and about half have formally ap-
proved of the use of screening."' Accordingly, imputed disquali-
tained as counsel for the plaintiffs. id. at 195. Thus, the attorney moving for dis-
qualification was actually arguing that the presumption of shared confidences should
be applied to his own conduct at his former firm. Id. at 196. As the court noted,
however, the attorney never claimed to have shared any confidential information
with his former firm. Id. at 196 n.4.
110. Id. at 197.
111. Id.
112. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
113. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420.
114. Id. at 421 (citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 259
(7th Cir. 1983)).
115. Schiesale, 717 F.2d at 421.
116. Courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have
approved screening, while courts in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits have either rejected screening or failed to approve it when given the opportuni-
ty. Compare Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 226 (6th
Cir. 1988); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 731-32 (11th Cir.
1988); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); Cheng v. GAF Corp.,
631 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903
(1981); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 428 (D.
Del. 1986); with Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1985); Kevlik v.
Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984); Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.
1983). See also McMin, cited at note 27, at 1264 (discussing those circuits that
have yet to review the issue).
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fication is now generally viewed as a presumption instead of a
rule. If a firm can show that its members did not receive any con-
fidential information from the "infected" attorney, the firm should
be permitted to continue its representation.
THE STATUS OF SCREENING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
In order to properly view the need for consistency, it is impor-
tant to examine the disparities which have developed in the way
the federal circuit courts have addressed, or in some cases avoid-
ed, the screening issue. Several of the courts have yet to rule on
the issue. Those that have ruled, generally allow the screening
defense. The end result is four separate situations leaving resolu-
tion of the issue dependent upon the circuit in which the case is
heard.
Approach A: No Cases on Point
While most of the circuit courts have at least addressed the
issue, two have yet to deal with a case based on the screening of
a private attorney. In the Fourth Circuit, the use of screening as
a defense to disqualification has not reached the appellate
level." 7 One district in the Fourth Circuit has expressed skepti-
cism of the Chinese wall defense."8 The Fifth Circuit, in con-
trast, has reached the screening issue, but all of the screening
cases involve former government attorneys and involved the type
of screening sanctioned by Formal Opinion 342."' Thus, these
cases are of little help in determining whether the Fifth Circuit
will permit the use of screening as a defense for private attor-
neys. In order for the availability of the screening defense to be
binding on lower courts, the circuit court in that jurisdiction
must hold that it is available. Because these courts have not
expressly approved of screening for private attorneys, the pre-
sumption must be that the screening or Chinese wall defense is
unavailable in these jurisdictions.
117. See McMinn, cited at note 27, at 1264.
118. See Tessier v. Plastics Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724, 734
(E.D. Va. 1990).
119. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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Approach B: The Decision Not to Decide
The second group of courts has refused to decide whether to
allow the screening defense. This approach has been followed by
the Courts of Appeals for the First,"m Third,12 1 Ninth" and
Tenth" Circuits. Apparently, these courts are waiting to see
what the consequences will be in those circuits that have decided
to allow screening.
In Kevlik v. Goldstein,2' the First Circuit declined to resolve
whether screening could be used as a defense to the presumption
that the confidential information obtained from a former client
had been shared with a firm." The court determined that be-
cause there was evidence of actual disclosure, a resolution of
whether the presumption could be rebutted was not neces-
sary.1" Likewise, in United States v. Miller, 7  the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to decide the screening ques-
tion because it had insufficient data as to how the screening
would proceed." The lower courts in the circuit, however, seem
to view Miller as permitting the use of screening if the court is
comfortable that it will work. In INA Underwriters Insurance Co.
v. Rubin," and Nemours Foundation v. Gilbane, Aetna, Federal
Insurance Co.," two district courts in the Third Circuit allowed
the use of screening because the screening process to be em-
ployed by the firms was effective at isolating the "infected" attor-
ney.31 These cases indicate that screening is currently permit-
ted in the Third Circuit.
In Trone v. Smith,"' the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the
120. See Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (lst Cir. 1984).
121. See United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980).
122. See Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.
1980).
123. See Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
124. 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984).
125. KeviA, 724 F.2d at 849 n.5. The court stated, "[w]e do not reach this issue
for two reasons: first Wiggin & Nourie is a firm of approximately twenty-five mem-
bers; second, it has not suggested that information received from [the former client]
was not transmitted to or learned by other members of the firm." Id.
126. Id. at 849.
127. 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980).
128. Miller, 624 F.2d at 1204.
129. 635 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
130. 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986).
131. Nemours Foundation, 632 F. Supp. at 429; INA Underwriters, 635 F. Supp.
at 5.
132. 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980).
1995 269
Duquesne Law Review
Code of Professional Responsibility in disqualifying a law
firm." Because the court was able to reach a decision on dis-
qualification without considering a Chinese walls defense, the
court refrained from addressing the acceptability of such a de-
fense."ls Three years later, the court again avoided addressing
the issue. In Paul E. Iacono Structural Engineer, Inc. v.
Humphrey,"s the Ninth Circuit noted, "[i]n Trone v. Smith, we
left open the question of whether firmwide disqualification would
be necessary if such a 'Chinese wall' screening procedure was
used .... Again we need not resolve this issue.""s
The screening defense, however, will probably be accepted by
the Ninth Circuit. In United States ex rel. Lord Electric Co. v.
Titan Pacific Construction Corp., 7 and Haagen-Dazs Co. v.
Persche No! Gelato, Inc.,"s two district courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit allowed the Chinese wall defense."" The district courts in
the Ninth Circuit, like those in the Third Circuit, indicate a will-
ingness to accept effective attorney screening.
The Tenth Circuit, in Smith v. Whatcott,'40 noted that courts
had extended the screening beyond government lawyers, but
decided not to rule on the permissibility of screening private
attorneys.' The court examined the decisions of the Seventh
Circuit that analyzed the mechanisms used to screen the infected
attorney.1 42 The court then noted that because there was no evi-
dence that screening had taken place, a ruling on the availability
of the screening defense was unnecessary."4  Based on Smith,
it is unclear whether the Tenth Circuit would permit the screen-
ing defense in an appropriate case.
The decision by the courts of appeals in these circuits to avoid
the issue may prevent them from deciding the issue at a later
time. In Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller,'" the Supreme
Court ruled that a district court decision granting a motion to
disqualify in a civil case is not an order subject to an interlocuto-
ry appeal.'" Thus, the disqualified firm is precluded from ap-
133. Trone, 621 F.2d at 998.
134. Id. at 999 n.4.
135. 722 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983).
136. lacono, 722 F.2d at 442 (citing Trone, 621 F.2d at 999).
137. 637 F. Supp. 1556 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
138. 639 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
139. Lord Electric, 637 F. Supp. at 1564; Haagen-Dazs, 638 F. Supp. at 287.
140. 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
141. Smith, 757 F.2d at 1101-02.
142. Smith, 757 F.2d at 1101.
143. Id.
144. 472 U.S. 424 (1985).
145. Koller, 472 U.S. at 426.
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pealing and has little choice but to turn over the litigation to
another firm. Once the case has been decided, it is unlikely that
many firms will want to litigate their disqualification because of
both the client's and the firm's limited resources.
There are two situations, however, in which a disqualification
might be litigated after the fact. The first arises when the client
strongly desires the original firm's representation and there is a
possibility that a similar disqualification motion will be filed in
future litigation. The other possible situation may occur when a
law firm that believes it has been wrongly disqualified due to
misrepresentations of adverse counsel, appeals the disqualifica-
tion ruling. While the appeal in the first situation would likely
address the merits of a Chinese wall defense, the second situa-
tion would focus on the actions of adverse counsel rather than on
the use of screening. The odds of the first type of case coming be-
fore those circuits who have yet to decide the availability of Chi-
nese walls is relatively small. Thus, the nondecision may effec-
tively prevent the courts from ever affirmatively addressing the
issue. When a particular circuit has not approved the use of
screening, other courts applying that circuit's law should not
permit the screening defense.1
Approach C: A Conservative Approach to Screening
The Eleventh Circuit has carved its own niche by applying a
very conservative approach to screening. This approach permits
screening to be used to help rebut the presumption of shared
confidences. In Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,"' the court
refused to disqualify a firm even though it would have been dis-
qualified under the "substantially related" test.' The court
commented that it had the responsibility to keep a balance be-
tween regulating ethical conduct and permitting the parties to
have counsel of their own choosing.149
The court considered several factors. The attorney that was
disqualified had left his former firm five years before the alleged
conflict, and had only recently joined the firm representing the
plaintiffs."W In addition, the disqualification would require the
plaintiffs to seek new counsel and would further delay the
146. See, e.g., Atasi Corp, v. Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
147. 847 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1988).
148. Cox, 847 F.2d at 731.
149. Id. (quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810. (5th Cir.
1976)).
150. Cox, 847 F.2d at 727.
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case." 1 Finally, the attorney had been screened from all meet-
ings and other communications regarding the case, and was not
permitted to share in any fees generated from the case. 2 Be-
cause of all of these factors, the firm was permitted to continue
its representation. In a footnote, the court made it clear that it
was not holding that the erection of a Chinese wall alone was
sufficient to overcome a motion for disqualification." Instead,
the use of screening was one of many factors to be considered.
Approach D: Screening Jurisdictions
The largest group of circuits is made up of those that appear to
permit the use of a Chinese wall defense to a motion for disquali-
fication. Following the lead of the Seventh' and Second155
Circuits, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth," and Federal"'
Circuits have also permitted the use of screening. Each of these
courts has recognized that the changes in the legal profession,
and the use of disqualification as a tactical device, require that
the courts utilize a more flexible approach to disqualification."
The screening defense allows courts the flexibility to permit rep-
resentation where there is little risk of revealed confidences.
While the Seventh Circuit has led the other circuits away from
irrebuttable presumptions, it originally adopted a different view.
As late as 1978, the Seventh Circuit considered the ethics rules
as the sole criterion for disqualification. In Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., ' the Seventh Circuit stated, "we do
not recognize the wall theory as modifying the presumption that
actual knowledge of one or more lawyers in a firm is imputed to
151. Id. at.731-32.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 732 n.l. "in light of our holding, we decline to discuss the
plaintiffs argument that the erection of a 'Chinese Wall' is sufficient in and of itself
to prevent the disqualification of [the attorney]. Id.
154. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983). See notes 111-14
and accompanying text for a discussion of Schiessle.
155. In Cheng, the Second Circuit implied that it would accept the screening
defense when a firm could show that the defense had been implemented in an ef-
fective manner. Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on
other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
156. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar, & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th
Cir. 1988).
157. See EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (apply-
ing Eighth Circuit law). See notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
158. Manning, 849 F.2d at 225; EZ Paintr Corp., 746 F.2d at 1461; Schiessle,
717 F.2d at 421; Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1058 n.7.
159. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
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each member of that firm."16 However, as was discussed in the
previous section, the Seventh Circuit modified this view in Novo
Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laborato-
ries,"' a year later. The Seventh Circuit further modified its
approach in Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co. 16 2 and
finally approved the screening defense in Schiessle v.
Stephens."
In addition to the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit was one
of the early trend-setters in the move away from irrebuttable
presumptions. In Cheng v. GAF Corp., the Second Circuit im-
plied that it would accept the screening defense when a firm
could show that the defense had been implemented in an effec-
tive manner, and the firm was large enough to prevent inadver-
tent disclosure."
In the same year, the Second Circuit decided Armstrong v.
McAlpin,"' which liberalized the approach to disqualification
by applying a functional analysis."'1 However, the court also
ruled that the denial of a disqualification motion was not appeal-
able." Given the decision in Armstrong and the Supreme
Court's holding in Koller,"6 9 the Second Circuit may not have
the opportunity to formally adopt the screening defense.
In Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 70 the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach to Chinese
walls. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Seventh had
"taken the most realistic view of the methodology to be followed
in resolving competing interests raised by such a disqualification
motion."171 The court accepted the use of the Chinese wall de-
fense and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
attorney had been properly screened.'1'
In EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., the Federal Circuit, ap-
plying Eighth Circuit law, permitted the use of screening. The
160. Kerr-McGee, 580 F.2d at 1321.
161. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979). See notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
162. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
163. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421 (citing LaSalle Natl Bank v. County of Lake,
703 F.2d 252, 259 (7th. Cir. 1983)).
164. 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903
(1981).
165. Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1058.
166. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980).
167. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 444.
168. Id.
169. See notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
170. 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988).
171. Manning, 849 F.2d at 225.
172. Id.
173. 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Federal Circuit asserted that the Eighth Circuit would follow the
"great weight of authority" that an attorney is presumed to have
divulged confidences to the firm "but that presumption is rebut-
table." 7' The Federal Circuit has yet to address screening ap-
plying its own law. However, the court's holdings in several cas-
es, particularly in EZ Paintr, indicate that is likely to permit the
screening defense.'75
In Panduit Corp. v. All. States Plastic Manufacturing Co.,176
the Federal Circuit, deciding a case based on Seventh Circuit
law, held that the presumption was rebutted even though no
formal screening procedures had been in place. 77 Because it did
not even require the firm to prove the existence of an effective
Chinese wall, the Federal Circuit, applying the law of other cir-
cuits has taken the most liberal approach to the use of screening.
With the wide disparity in the circuit courts as to the availabil-
ity of screening, some consistency is needed. Presently, the iden-
tical facts could produce three very different results depending on
which circuit had jurisdiction over the matter. The changes in
the legal profession and the use of disqualification as a tactical
device must be balanced against the former client's right to pre-
serve confidences. If implemented properly, Chinese walls are the
most practical solution to the problem.
PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR CONSISTENCY
By employing a combination of factors discussed in disqualifi-
cation cases, courts would be able to balance the right to confi-
dentiality and the right to counsel of choice. In addition, the
consistent application of a definitive group of factors would de-
crease the need for disqualification motions. If an attorney could
more accurately predict what representations the court will al-
low, a considerable amount of delay and court time could be
saved. Additionally, the clients would be better served by avoid-
ing the cost in both money and time that disqualification motions
cause.
174. EZ Paintr, 746 F.2d at 1461.
175. Id. at 1459 (asserting that "one possible way of dealing with the presump-
tion is to fully 'screen off' the attorney changing sides as soon as he joins the new
firm.).
176. 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
177. Panduit Corp., 744 F.2d at 1580-81.
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The Amended Rule 1.10
In light of the inconsistency between the courts, Rule 1.10
should be changed to create guidelines for the use of screening,
and to minimize the problems inherent in disqualification mo-
tions.
A proposal for an Amended Rule 1.10 follows.'78
Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification and Screening:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be pro-
hibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. unless the attorney
with the conflict of interest is screened.
(b) To determine if screening is appropriate. the following factors should
be considered:
(1) The degree and relationship between the representations and
the likelihood that the attorney acquired confidential information:
(2) The position of the attorney at the time of the prior representa-
(3) The amount of time between the two representations
(4) The amount of time between the discovery of a conflict and the
erection of screening devices:
(5) The probable effectiveness of the screening devices put in place:
(6) Whether the attorney to be screened will share in the profits
from the case: and
(7) The timing of a motion for disqualification, if any.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests mate-
rially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated
lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which
the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter and that lawyer
has not been screened.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affect-
ed client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Many of these changes are similar to the approach recommend-
ed in the original draft of the Comment to Rule 1.10.179 Had it
been adopted then, much of the confusion over disqualification
could have been avoided.
178. The information added to the original rule has been underlined.




Application of the Changes
The impact of the amended rule is best demonstrated through
examples of its application. The following are rationales for each
change, and situations that demonstrate the benefit of the new
rule.
The Degree of Relation Between Representations
The first factor in determining whether disqualification is
appropriate is the degree of relation between the former and
current representation and the likelihood of acquired confidential
information.1" The most workable version in use right now is
the Seventh Circuit's modification of the substantially related
test.18 1 Even within the substantially related test, however,
there are varying degrees. For example, a new associate in a
large firm may have worked extensively on one question of law,
such as jurisdiction. In the process of working on this issue, it is
unlikely that the new associate acquired any confidential infor-
mation about the client that would prejudice the client's rights
after the jurisdictional issue was resolved. Under the traditional
application of the substantially related test, however, the attor-
ney would be immediately disqualified if the former firm's repre-
sentation of the client was substantially related to a matter being
handled by the attorney's new firm.
In contrast, consider the situation where a senior associate
worked briefly on a revocable living trust for a client. After the
attorney moves to a new firm, the new firm is retained for a case
which involves attaching the assets owned by the attorney's for-
mer client. While the case may not be substantially related to the
former representation, the attorney could do much more harm by
telling the firm what assets the former client has and where to
find them, than could the new associate who is an expert on the
intricacies of diversity jurisdiction. Thus, the representation must
be weighed against the likelihood that the attorney acquired
confidential information that could harm the client.
180. This was included in the original draft of the Comment to Rule 1.10, but
was rejected by the committee. See Comment 11, cited at note 178.
181. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1978). See notes 84-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Westinghouse
decision.
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The Attorney's Position
Closely related to the first factor is the attorney's professional
position at the time of the former representation."8 Under the
traditional application of the substantially related test, an asso-
ciate who prepared a memorandum on a point of law is viewed in
the same light as a partner who coordinated the case. The end
result could be that an attorney with little knowledge of the case
would be treated in the same manner as the case's lead counsel.
Before a disqualification decision is made, the court should con-
sider the attorney's position at the time of the prior representa-
tion; the more senior the attorney, the more likely that disqualifi-
cation is appropriate.
Furthermore, an attorney may have acquired confidential in-
formation about a client or its legal affairs even though he or she
was not formally "representing" the client. For example, a senior
partner at a firm may not be handling a particular case, but is
likely to be consulted and kept informed of developments if the
case is substantial. In contrast, a first-year associate might know
very little about any case outside the area in which he or she has
been assigned to work. In such a situation, court approved
screening of the partner would probably better protect the former
client than would screening the first-year associate. The partner
probably has more of a direct interest in the outcome of the liti-
gation, both monetarily and professionally, than the new associ-
ate.
The Time Between the Representations
The third factor is the length of time that has elapsed since
the representation of the former client. 1' Even if a matter is
substantially related, it is unlikely that an attorney could do
much damage if he or she worked on the case as an associate
fifteen years ago. Memories fade and many things that may have
been client confidences have either changed or become public
record. Obviously, there are situations when even the passage of
time does not make the confidence useless; antitrust cases can
last up to twenty years. However, the court is likely to be aware
182. The original Comment to Rule 1.10 referred to the lawyer's professional
experience. See Comment 11, cited at note 178.
183. See United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Co., 637 F.
Supp. 1556, 1565-66 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (considering not only the nature of the rep-
resentation, but the amount of time since the representation).
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if the case is of this nature and can account for that factor.
As an example, the scenario involving the attorney who
worked on the living trust is applicable here also. If the firm is
hired to find and attach assets fifteen years after the attorney
helped with the trust, there is little chance that the attorney
could harm the former client. The attorney would likely have
forgotten what assets the former client had, and the former cli-
ent's assets have probably changed dramatically.
When the Chinese Wall was Erected
Another consideration is the speed with which screening proce-
dures are implemented. If the wall or screening measures are not
implemented within a very short time after a conflict is discov-
ered, the defense should not be allowed. A wall is meaningless if
the other attorneys in the office have had time to obtain informa-
tion from the attorney having the conflict. In contrast, a wall
established immediately after the conflict arises should be pre-
sumptively valid.
For example, if Attorney Y of the firm takes on a new client
and Attorney X of the firm formerly represented the client's ad-
versary in a similar matter, efforts must be made to prevent X
and Y from relaying information. As soon as the conflict is discov-
ered, the office coordinator should be notified. The office coordi-
nator should then inform the rest of the office that no one is to
speak with Attorney X about the case. Files on the case should be
immediately placed where Attorney X does not have access to
them, and any files in the possession of Attorney X which might
have confidential information about the former client should be
placed where those handling the case cannot access them. Fur-
ther, Attorneys X and Y should not continue to work on any cases
together.
The courts that do permit screening have taken a close look at
similar factors. In EZ Paintr, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
disqualification of a firm because the firm had waited three
months to erect Chinese walls."' The courts realize that if the
screening procedures are not implemented quickly, there is little
guarantee that information has not been passed, if even only by
accident. Therefore, it is important that the screening be imple-
mented as soon as is reasonably possible.
184. See EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
278 Vol. 33:249
Consistency in Attorney Disqualification
The Practical Effectiveness of the Wall
Another factor is the effectiveness of the wall. Here the court
should look at the size of the firm and the screening procedures
used. 5' A large firm will likely be more structured and have
less contact between any two given attorneys than will a smaller
firm. A large firm is also more likely to have separate depart-
ments that can assist in isolating one attorney from another. In
contrast, a small firm is less likely to be able to sever all working
relationships between two of its attorneys.
These considerations will usually make it easier for large firms
to show that screening was implemented properly." While su-
perficially this apparent favoritism may seem unfair, closer ex-
amination reveals that it is not. Large firms have a much greater
need for screening than do smaller firms."7 Thus, allowing
large firms to use screening more often is balanced by their in-
creased need for the screening defense.
A court should also consider exactly what constitutes the wall.
Even a small firm with screening measures that totally isolate
the two attorneys is more likely to keep the client's confidences
intact than a large firm that simply has a policy that the- attor-
neys involved are not to discuss the case. Some commentators
have suggested that the use of limited access filing cabinets and
computer programs should be required to achieve the most effec-
tive screening."
The Attorney's Potential Profit
Many of the courts that allow screening prohibit the attorney
from sharing in the fees generated by the case. 89 If the
screened attorney is a salaried associate, he or she probably has
much less of a financial interest in revealing secrets than does a
partner who gets a significant percentage of the firm's profits.
Even though the screened partner cannot receive any fees from
the case, the partner will indirectly benefit from the overall prof-
185, See Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1058; see also Winslow, cited at note 37, at 884-
85.
186. See Winslow, cited at note 37, at 884-85.
187. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 81 (1978). "rhe
risk of conflict rises exponentially with the size of the firm." Id.
188. See Winslow, cited at note 37, at 884.
189. See, e.g., Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725 (11th Cir.
1988); United States ex rel. Lord Else. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Co., 637 F. Supp.
1556, 1565-66 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
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itability of the firm. The partner will have a much greater incen-
tive to circumvent the screening. Thus, the court should also look
at what the indirect profit will be to the attorney.1"
Timing of the Motion for Disqualification
Both firms and courts should also consider the timing of the
motion for disqualification.19" ' The harm caused to a client by
the disqualification of counsel is much less if the disqualification
occurs shortly after the initial pleading. With the exception of the
party's loss of its choice of counsel, the most significant harm
comes after the firm has put a large amount of work into re-
searching the case and developing case strategy. The harm in-
creases exponentially in the short time before trial. If the firm is
disqualified then, the cost to the client in time, money and aggra-
vation may be enormous. While an early motion for disqualifica-
tion should be weighed in favor of the former client, a court
should be reluctant to grant a motion for disqualification shortly
before trial. In fact, the only situation in which such a late mo-
tion should be granted is where there is a significant risk of
confidential information being disclosed and the moving party
can prove that it did not know of, nor have reason to know of
opposing counsel's conflict of interest until shortly before the
motion was filed.
If a motion is timely made, i.e. shortly after initial pleadings,
the firm must consider its duty to the client. If there is a like-
lihood that the motion will be granted, the firm should withdraw,
unless the client consents after full disclosure of both the conflict
and the potential consequences of litigating the motion. It is a
conflict of interest for a firm to spend the client's money trying to
avoid disqualification unless it would be more costly for the client
to retain new counsel. By fighting disqualification, the firm may
be putting its own interests above those of the client. Thus, be-
fore challenging the motion, the firm should obtain the client's
informed consent.
If a motion is made shortly before trial, the firm would be
acting in the client's best interest by challenging the motion
instead of allowing the motion to waste more time and money
than that already expended in litigating the case. Therefore,
while the firm should still obtain the informed consent of the
190. See Lord Electric, 637 F. Supp. at 1565-66.
191. See generally Tobin, cited at note 4, at 219 (arguing that courts should
readily grant motions to disqualify at the beginning of representation, but rarely
when the trial is near).
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client, the required disclosure would seemingly be less controver-
sial, and the firm would be more justified in presenting a screen-
ing defense.
CONCLUSION
The changes in the legal profession have necessitated a change
in the way courts decide motions for disqualification. Because of
the hardships that disqualification can impose both on law firms
and their clients, many courts have moved away from the rigidity
of the ethics rules and toward the flexibility of rebuttable pre-
sumptions. This shift has led a slight majority of the circuit
courts to recognize the use of screening procedures as a defense
to the presumption of shared confidences and imputed disqualifi-
cation.
Instead of rejecting the use of the screening defense, the ABA
should amend the Model Rules to help the courts administer
screening in a manner that will balance the protection of client
confidences and the freedom to counsel of choice. If the ABA were
to amend the Model Rules, it would have the twofold benefit of
allowing the ABA to guide the use of screening to reach the fair-
est result, while enabling the courts to take a unified stand on
the acceptability of screening.
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